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Abstract: We explore how an incumbent airline firm structures its route network
under the threat of entry caused by deregulation. We show that entry induces the
incumbent firm to strategically alter its flight operating network from a fully
connected network (FC) to a hub-and-spoke network (HS). Whi1e most of the
literature always assumed that the use of a HS network is primarily for the purpose
of cost reduction, we show that hub-and-spoke operation can be used as a strategic
device by the incumbent firm when it faces a threat of entry in its operating zone.
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"You may go to heaven or heU when you die,
but you'll certainly stop in Atlanta [hub airport] on the way."
(Folk saying in Florida)
"You may go to heaven when you die, but at least it's a hell
of a lot cheaper than going to Atlanta."
(A comment on an earlier draft)
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Among the many changes that took place in the worldwide aviation industry
since the process of deregulation started in different regions in different phases,
the intensified use of the hub-and-spoke network stands out as one of the most
significant one. In a very short period after the deregulation, the hub-and-spoke
routing in the US airline market had gone up by about 50 percent (Bailey et al.,
1985; McShane and Windle, 1989). The rise in hub-and-spoke operation is also
prevalent in Europe and other countries where deregulation took place and today
almost ail the major airlines all over the world operate a route network which is
essentially a central hub oriented. Hence, the natural question arises, why do we
observe a significant increase of hub-and-spoke routing network in the present
aviation market? In order to find a possible answer to that question; in this
paper, we develop a theoretical model which shows an airline firm which operates
as a monopoly in a regulated market would find it profitable to switch to a
hub-and-spoke network when it faces a potential entrant in its operating zone
under a deregulated regime. We prove that switching to a hub-and-spoke network
from a fully connected network (or a point-to-point network) is actually a strategic
choice employed by an incumbent airline firm when it faces a threat of entry in
its operating zone in a deregulated market regime.
In general, the literature on the emergence of the hub-and-spoke route network
in aviation can be classified into two main categories depending on the explanations
given to this phenomenon. The first is based on cost considerations where the
shift to a hub-and-spoke network yields cost savings io the airline firm emanating
from passenger density-economies and aircraft-size economies. For example, based
on an empirical study of US airlines (1970-1984), McShane and Windle (1989)
report that a 1 percent increase in hub-and-spoke routing result in a 0.11 percent
decline in unit cost. Bittlingmayer ( 1990), Hendricks et al. (1995), and Starr and
Stinchcombe ( 1992), assumed the existence of network economies that stem from
economies of traffic density and economies of joint production (in a network
setting), in order to explain the formation of a hub-and-spoke networks. Morrison
and Winston ( l 986) argue that, given demand elasticities, economies of aircraft-size
can explain the utilization of a hub-and-spoke network.
The second type of explanation given in the literature for the dominant
prevalence of a hub-and-spoke network, pertains to demand conditions, mainly
passengers preferences relative to price and frequency of flights. Accordingly,
passengers are willing to travel to their final destination via a hub rather than
directly, since the increase in frequency of operations (Aircraft Movements, per
week) in a hub-and-spoke network, and decline in the airfare for passengers
travelling between non-hub locations, more than compensate them for their loss
in utility from having to fly via a hub (Barrett, 1990; Morrison and Winston,
1986; Vi ton, 1986). Berechman and Shy ( 1996), have presented a theoretical model
which shows that for a certain range of passengers demand elasticity with respect
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to frequency and willingness to pay for flying directly, an airline firm will operate
a hub-and-spoke network (see also Encaoua et a1., 1996, for a similar analysis).
In contrast to the above, in this paper, we provide a strategic market explanation
for the hub-and-spoke phenomenon which also rationalizes the presently observed,
oligopolistic structure of the aviation industry. On the demand side, we have two
groups of passengers who are differentiated with respect to their value of time.
One group has a high value of time (for example, business travelers), and hence
gain a higher utility if they fly directly to their final destination from their city of
origin. The other group has a low value of time (for example, leisure travellers),
and hence are less concerned whether they fly directly or indirectly to their final
destination. Under this demand structure, we show that entry of a new airline
induces the incumbent airline firm to strategically alter its operating network
structure from a,fully connected network (FC) to a hub-and-spoke network (HS).
Whereas most of the literature always assumed that the use of a HS network is
primarily for the purpose of cost reduction, we demonstrate that hub-and-spoke
operation can be used as a strategic device by the incumbent airline when it faces
a threat of entry into it operating zone.
In this connection, we would like to mention that recent similar studies by Oum
et al. (1995) and Hendricks et al. (1997), which analyze the strategic interactions
among the airline firms, where one of the strategic variables is again the choice
of network. Oum et al. consider a three-city two stage networking game between
two carriers. In the first stage, firms simultaneously select their route structures
(i.e. either a fully connnected network or a hub-and-spoke network). Each airline
firm incurs sunk investment cost of hub development if it chooses a HS network.
In the second stage, firms simultaneously set their output levels for a city-pair
market by competing in Cournot-Nash fashion. They showed that investment in
hubbing makes a firm 'tough' in product market competition, thus, hubbing is a
'top-dog' strategy in the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole ( 1984). On the
other hand, Hendricks et al. considered an entry game where a regional carrier (the
entrant) invades a spoke (i.e. a route between a non-hub and hub city) of the
hub-and-spoke system of a national carrier (the incumbent). They showed that if
the size of the network is large enough, the hub operator's optimal response to
entry in a spoke is not to withdraw its flights from that spoke, even if the regional
carriers stays. As a result, regional carriers are forced to exit and entry is deterred.
In contrast to this literature, in this paper, we consider a entry game where the
entrant wants to operate in a route connecting between two non-hub cities or in
other words, wants to enter the "rim" of the hub-and-spoke system (as opposed
to the "spoke") of the incumbent firm. 1 We conduct our analysis using heterogeneous passengers and characterize a price competition between an incumbent
and a potential entrant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe
1

Indeed, a number of airline companies in the US. such as Southwest Airlines. Reno Air, and
Morris Air, have invaded into rims of hub-and-spoke networks.
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our model. In section 3, we consider the case of a single monopoly airline. The
main analysis. is done in section 4, where we consider entry. Finaily, section 5
concludes with some discussions.

2.

THE MODEL

Consider an economy composed of three cities A, B, and C. Each city pair is
connected by an airline route denoted by i, i I, 2, 3. Thus, a route i is defined
as a link connecting a specific pair of cities. A passenger can be transported by
an airline firm either directly from his city of origin to his city of destination, or
indirectly through a third city. Such a city will be called a hub.
We distinguish between two basic types of networks that the firm can operate:
a Fully-Connected-network (FC) (i.e. a point-to-point network), where all
passengers are serviced via direct flights between origin-destination city pairs; and
a Hub-and-Spokes network (HS) where alJ city pairs are linked via a hub. Thus,
under the HS network, there are no direct services between city pairs except for
those passengers whose final destination or point of departure is the hub city
itself. Figures la and 1b illustrate a FC network and a HS network with a hub
located at city B. 2 Thus, there are three routes: route 1 connecting A and B, route
2 connecting B to C, and route 3 connecting A to C To simplify the notation
and the analysis we disregard round trips.
2.1 Passengers
We assume that on each route i, i = l, 2, 3 there are two types of passengers who
are differentiated with respect to their value of time (i) n > 0 passengers with high
value of time are assumed to gain an extra utility of d, (d> 0), from flying directly
to their final destination instead of indirectly through the hub; and (ii) n > 0
passengers with a low value of time are assumed to be indifferent between flying
directly or indirectly to their destination. A good example of the first type of
passengers could be business travelers and of the second type could be leisure
travelers.
Let Pi denote the airfare on route i. The utility of a passenger with a high value
of time on route i is affected by whether the flight is direct or an indirect and by
the airfare. Formally,

if flies directly to destination
if flies to destination via a hub
if does not fly at all .

(1)

2 In this paper, we do not discuss the reasons for choosing city Bas the location of the hub. This
choice can have a mix of economic. historic!ll, and institutional reasons, see Hansen and Kanafani

( 1990).
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The utility of a passenger with low value of on route i is affected by the airfare
only. Hence,
if flies directly or indirectly
if does not fly at all .

(2)

where {3, ({3 > 0) is the basic value a passenger attaches to the service of being
transported from a city of origin to the city of destination.
(Hub)

i=2

i=3

I a) FC network : one-way
Fig. I.

l

b) HC network: one-way

Fully connected and hub-and-spoke network structures.

2.2 The Airline Firm
Let c, (c>O), denote the airline's cost per flight on any route i. Observe that
this cost is per flight and not per passenger, and will therefore be referred to as
the ACM cost (Aircraft Movement Cost). Let K denote the aircraft capacity. That
is, K is the maximum number of passengers that can be flown on a single aircraft.
We assume that f3>2c/K which guarantees that hub-and-spoke services are
economically valuable in the sense that a passenger's valuation for an indirect
flight exceeds the per passenger cost of routing the consumer via a hub.
3.

A SINGLE MONOPOLY AIRLINE

Consider an airline firm operating under a regulatory regime which permits
only one firm to provide services to all cities. This type of regime is observed in
a number of countries where only one airline is allowed to provide all domestic
flights. We assume that this firm behaves as a monopoly, i.e. that it charges
monopoly fares. 3 This analysis will serve as our benchmark case.
3
One could argue that a single regulated firm is not allowed to charge monopolistic airfare. Here,
we associate a single regulated firm with a monopoly since assuming otherwise complicates the analysis
in the sense that there is no consensus of what are the objectives of a single regulated
airline firm.
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3.1 Fully Connected Service Only
A Fu1ly Connected (FC) network is defined here as a network in which traveling
from any city of origin into any city of destination consists of a direct flight which
does not involve routing via a hub. In reality, save perhaps for low level operations
where an airline provides direct services in few markets (routes) only, most airlines
maintain many indirect flights. 4
On each route! the monopoly airline has two options: (i) to charge a low price
Pi= f3 and serve both types of passengers, or (ii) Pi= /J + d and serve only the
passengers with high value of time. Let rei denote profit from the operation on
route 1, 1 1, 2, 3, and let re denote the monopo1y airline's profit from the operation
of the network. That is, re n 1 +re 2 +n 3 •
When the airfare is low (pi= fJ), the number of flights on each route is 2n/ K,
hence, re;=2n(fJ-c/K). When the fare is high (pi=fJ+d), the number of flights
on each route is n/ K, hence, n 1 = n(/J + d- c/ K). Comparing the two profits level
yield
p·=
1
{

/J+d if d>/J-c/K h
Fe
{311(/J+d) 3nc/k if d>P-c/K
ence re ,
/J
if d-5:/1-c/k
'
6n/J 6nc/K
if d5:P-c/K

(3)

Equation (3) reveals that if the 'business' passengers have a very high value of
time (d takes a large value), then a monopoly airline operating a FC network will
raise the price to extract the entire surplus from these travelers, thereby excluding
the passengers with low value of time. In contrast, if d is low, then a
profit-maximizing monopoly airline will adjust to price as to extract the entire
surplus from passengers with low value of time~ in this case, since the network is
FC, passengers with a high value of time gain a surplus equals exactly to d.

3.2

Huh-and-Spoke
Using a HS network, the airline transports route 3 passengers via a hub in city
B. In order to determine the airline's monopoly airfares under the HS network,
we need to make the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION l: Passengers purchasing a ticket .fi'om cit_v A to city Care flown
via the hub located in the city B, can wstlessly get o.ff' or get on a plane in city B
thereby terminating or starting their journey in city B.

Assumption 1 implies that the airfare the airline can charge passengers on routes
I and 2 cannot exceed the airfare on route 3, since otherwise, route I passengers
would purchase a ticket for travelling to city C and then get off in hub city B.
Similarly, under this constraint, route 2 passengers would puchase a ticket for

-+ This definition is quite strong, but serves well our analytical investigation. Notice that even the
now-established Southwest Airlines provides some level of hub operations, see Jennings ( 1993).
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traveling on route 3 and board the plane in hub city B. 5 Clearly, assumption 1
is more realistic than assuming the polar situation where passenger are not allowed
to embark or disembark at city B. However, it should be pointed out that in some
cases, airline companies make it difficult for passengers whose destination is city
C to disembark in city B by simply shipping their luggage to city C.
Under this assumption, since route 3 passengers are flown indirectly via a hub,
if the monopoly airline set a high fare, Pi= f3 +d, then it excludes all route 3
passengers from the market. In addition, all other passengers with a low value of
time are excluded, so only 2n passengers will be flying with the airline. In contrast,
if it charges a low fare, Pi= /3, all the 6n passengers fly with their airline, thereby
generating Sn/ K flights. Summing up, the monopoly's profit maximizing airfare
and profit levels under the HS network are
p

-{f3+d if d>2/3
if3
if d~2f3

3c/K
HS
{2n(f3+d)-2nc/K if d>2f3-3c/K
hence, n =
3c/K
6nf3-8nc/K
if d~2f3-3c/K

(4)
A line-by-line comparison of (3) and (4) yields

1.

For a monopoly airline, given the assumed constant returns to
scale airline technology, the FC network is more profitable to operate than the HS
network.
PROPOSITION

Proposition 1 follows from the assumed constant returns to scale technology,
implying that the HS network is not profitable due to the increase in the cost
associated with the increase in the number of flights on routes I and 2. Clearly,
Proposition 1 could be mitigated if we assume increasing returns in the form of
excess aircraft capacity. However, since our main purpose is to compare the effect
of entry on the choice of network, the present formulation is sufficient.

4.

PARTIAL DEREGULATION AND PARTIAL ENTRY

Partial deregulation is defined as the case where entry is permitted in one market
(route) only. Good examples are the markets between London and Amsterdam,
Dublin and Amsterdam and Dublin and London, which were deregulated even
though most other routes originated and terminating at these cities are still
5

As many travelers already know. it's usually cheaper to fly to say, Dallas, by buying a ticket to
Austin, Texas, with a stopover in Dallas. The flier then simply gets off the airplane in Dallas, saving
hundreds of dollars because most airlines charge cheaper fares to less-popu]ar destinations. Also,
recently, this kind of arbitrage is reported in the trans-Atlantic routes as well. According to some
airline executives, even the Armani suited crowd on the Concorde is trying this trick. They are
buying tickets to Brussels from New York, for example, but getting off the plane in London.
(New York-London is $4,758 one way; New York-London-Brussels is $3,900). It's direct violation
of airline rules, but hard to enforce. "People do it", says a fares analyst at Virgin Atlantic
Airways. who vows that "the whole industry i~ taking a look at this"-Source: Wall Street Journal
Europe, November 29-30, 1996.
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regulated, (see Barrett, 1990).
We now analyze the strategic use of the network structure by the incumbent
airline when entry is allowed into route 3. The incumbent firm is denoted by I
and the potential entrant by E. Under this policy regime, a new entrant can enter
in one route only. Given that under HS there is no direct service on route 3, this
route is a natural candidate for entry.
We assume that the potential entrant has the same cost and capacity structure
as the incumbent airline firm. This rules out any kind of ex ante asymmetry (for
example cost or capacity advantage) between the two airline firms.
We define a three stage game between the incumbent and the entering airline
firm. At stage I, the incumbent chooses whether to maintain its FC network, or
whether to restructure its route network to a HS. In stage II, the incumbent
chooses its airface on each route, p{, i = 1, 2, 3. In stage III, the entering airline
chooses its route 3 airfare, pf Figure 2 illustrates this game.
Stage I : ( INCUMBENT)

FC

Stage III : ( Route 3 Entrant )

Fig.· 2.

The game between an incumbent and a route 3 entrant.
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We look for a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for this game. We, therefore,
proceed by calculating the equilibrium airfare for the two subgames, the FC
subgame and the HS subgame.
4.1 The Fully Connected Subgame
Airfare competition on route 3 reduces the incumbent and the entrant's airfare
to unit cost. Hence, p~ = p~ = c/K. Hence, the incumbent does not earn above
normal profit on route 3, that is n~ = 0. Hence,
7CI,FC =

{2n(f3 +d)-2nc/K if d> {J-c/K
4n[J-4nc/K
if ds[J-c/K.

(5)

4. 2 The Hub-and-Spokes Subgame
Assumption 1 implies that any price reduction the incumbent makes on route
3, must be made on routes 1 and 2. The most important observation we now
make is that the incumbent cannot profitably deter entry on route 3. This follows
from the analysis of the previous subgame, where airfare competition on route 3
reduces the incumbent's profit on route 3 to zero. Therefore, it is profitable for
the incumbent to raise route 3 airfare to a level in which the entrant will serve
the high value of time passengers, whereas the incumbent serves the low value of
time passengers by an indirect flight via the hub. Therefore,

2. In the HS subgame, in stage II, if the incumbent does not
abandon route 3, then its profit-maximizing airfare is: pf =Min{d+c/K, fJ}.
PROPOSITION

Proof We first must show that at this airfare, the entrant will not find it
profitable to undercut the incumbent in stage III by setting p~=p{-e, where
s > 0 is a small number. This happens when
re

E

I

=(pi +d)n-

nc
K

I

~2n(pi -E)

2nc
K'

or

pf sd+

c
K

(6)

Equation (6) shows what maximal price set by the incumbent will lead the entrant
to increase its own price top~= pf+ d and serve the high value of time consumers,
instead of undercutting the incumbent by settingp~=pf-E. Finally, clearly, profit
can only be reduced if the incubment sets pf< d + c/ K and cannot be set above p
as no route 3 passenger is willing to pay more than [J.
Q.E.D.
Hence, the profit of the incumbent firm
rel.HS= {

5n{J-6nc/K
5n(d+c/K) 6nc/K

if d>[J-c/K
if ds[J-c/K.

(7)

We now state our main proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. An incumbent airline firm which faces an entering airline firm
on route 3 and which does not abandon route 3 (i.e., some route 3 passengers fly
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1t'ith the incumbent) 1rill choose to operate a HS network over the FC network
Hhenever ~ (4/3-3c/K)sds-!(3/3-4c/K).
Proof First note that under the FC network, airfare in route 3 drops to unit
cost, hence the incumbent makes zero profits from that route. Looking at a
1ine-by-line comparison of (5) and (7) yields the following.
When d> (/3-c/ K), HS operation is profitable than FC operation if and only if
ds i(3{J 4c/K). Notice that i-(3/3-4c/K)>(/3-c/K) as long as /3>2c/K
(by assumption).
On the other hand, when d s (/3-c/ K), HS operation is profitable than FC
operation if and only if d~ ~-( 4/3- 3c/ K). Here also, -}( 4/3- 3c/K) < (/3 c/ K)
as long as /3 > 2c/ K.
Combining above cases, we get the result.
Q.E.D.

Following Proposition 3, we can now state the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium for the incumbent to operate HS network, setpf=Min{d+c/K, /3},
and the entering airline to set
pf+d

·r pisc+I
f C

1

K

p~=
{

p/-t

(8)

if p! >d+-c
I

K

Finally, it should be pointed out that in some instances the incumbent will want
to abandon route 3 passengers and serve routes I or 2 only and charge f3 or f3 + d.
It should be noted that operating a fully connected network when the entrant
enters in route 3 is equivalent to abandon route 3 so far as the profit of the
incumbent is concerned because both the cases entail zero profit to the incumbent
firm from that route. When the incumbent abandons route 3, obviously the Fe
and the HS network are identica1.
COROLLARY. Incumbent airline will abandon route 3 while facing a new entrant in that route and (i) charge a price /3 +d in routes l and 2 ~f and only
(/' d>+(3/3-4c/K), (ii) charge a price {J in routes 1 and 2 ~f and only if
d < ·~ (4/J-3c/K).

Intuitive1y, this means when d is "'high" (actually so high) that it is most
profitable to charge f3 + d and extract all the surplus from route l and 2 high
time-valued passengers and abandon route 3 and other low time-valued passengers
in route 1 and 2. On the other hand when d is ''low" the maximum price that
the incumbent firm can charge under a HS operation is low. This price does not
generate enough profit to the firm to maintain HS operation and thus it abandons
route 3. Notice that under HS operation the incumbent has to fly the route 3 low
time-valued passengers twice, which inevitably increases its operating cost. Hence,
when dis "medium" it is most profitable to operate a HS network by serving the
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= 312 ( 13-c/ K)-c/2K

d

c/K

........ ..... ... .. ........... .
0

c/K

03 -c/K)

Fig. 3. Equilibrium configuration and incumbent's action in the entire
parameter space of {d, p, cfK}.

low time-valued passengers in route 3 without abandoning the route. This shows
our main point that if the incumbent finds it profitable to serve at least some
route 3 passengers, its only profit-maximizing network of operation is the HS
network.

5.

DISCUSSION: HUB-AND-SPOKE AND ENTRY

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the strategic use of the network
structure in response to a threat of entry of a new airline. In order to do that, we
need to demonstrate that the HS network will be chosen than the FC network
whenever the incumbent airline firm finds it profitable to serve at least some
passengers in the threatened route. Proposition 1 shows that under constant
returns, the HS will not be used by a monopoly airline, while proposition 3 establishes the condition that would induce the incumbent airline to accommodate
entry by switching to the HS network.
The use of the HS network under entry accommodation serves the incumbent
as a mean to differentiate the service provided by the incumbent and the entrant.
By shifting to HS network the incumbent can prevent a stiff price competition
with the entrant associated with having both airline firms providing a homogeneous
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service under the FC network. The result in proposition 3 stems from the fact
that since passengers are heterogeneous with respect to their value of time, the
entrant and the incumbent can split the market according to passengers' value of
time. We showed, that there is a significant range of d (the time preference
parameter) under which the incumbent will indeed operate a HS network since
the two services (direct and indirect) become differentiated. This finding give us
a rationale about the fact of prevalent existence of a hub-and-spoke network in
the present aviation industry.

REFERENCES
Bailey, E., D. Graham. and D. Kaplan. 1985. Deregulating the airlines, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Barrett S. D., 1990. "Deregulating European Aviation··. Transportation, 16, 311-327.
Bcrechman. Land 0. Shy, 1996. "The structure of Airline Equilibrium Networks". in Van der Bergh,
Nijkamp and Rietveld (eds.). Recent Adl'ances in Spatial Equilibrium: Methodologies and
Applications, A Volume in honour (d. Pn~l T. Takayama, Amsterdam: Springer.
Bittlingmayer, G., 1990, "Efficiency and entry in a Simple Airline Network". Imemafi(Jlw/ Journal of'
Industrial Organi:::atio11. 8. 245--257.
Borenstein. S .. 1992. "The Evolution of US Airline Competition". Joumal
Economic PenpectiPes,
6. 45-73.
Doganis. R .. 1992, Flying ldf Course, Routledge, London.
Encaoua, D., M. Moreaux, and A. Perrot, 1996. "Demand Side Network Effects in Airline Markets".
Infl!rnational Journal of Industrial Organization. 14(6), 701-726.
Fudenberg. D .. and J. Tirole. 1984, 'The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog ploy, and the lean and hungry
look", American Economic Rel'ie1r (Papei's mu/ Proceedings). 74, 361-368.
Hansen, M., and A. Kanafani, 1990, ''Airline Hubbing and Airport Economics", Transportation
Research. 24(3), 217-230.
Hendricks. K .. M. Piccione. and G. Tan, 1995, "The Economics of Hubs- "The Case of Monopoly",
Rel'inr (~l Economic Studies, 62, 83-99.
Hendricks, K., M. Piccione, and G. Tan, 1997. "'Entry and exist in Hub-Spoke Networks''. Rand
Journal
Economics, 28(2), 291-303.
Jennings, M., 1993,"Hub Hubbub". Airlines Business, 24-27.
McShane, S., and R. Windle, 1989, "The Implications of the Hub-and Spoke Routing for Airline
Costs and Competitiveness", The Logistics and Tram1)()rtation Re11ie1r, 25, 209-230.
Morrison, S. A .. and C. Winston. 1986. "Intercity Transportation Route Structure under Deregulation:
Some Assessment Motivated by the Airline Experience", American Economic Revieir, Papers
and Proceedings, 57-65.
Oum, T. H., A. Zhang, and Y. Zhang, 1995, "Airline Network Rivaly", Canadian Journal oj'Economics,
836-857.
Starr. R., and M. Stinchcombe, 1992, ·'Efficient Transportation Routing and Natural Monopoly in
the Airline Industry: An Economic Analysis of Hub-Spoke and Related Systems'', Department
of Economics, University of California, San-Diego Discussion Paper 92-25.
Viton, P. A .. 1986. "Air Deregulation Revisited: Choice of Aircraft, Load Factors, and Marginal-Cost
Fares for Domestic Air Travel". Trm1sporrarion Research, 20A(5), 361-371.

or

or

